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Abstract 
This study presents evidence on the relations between executive perquisite consumption and 
indicators of corporate governance, taking into account firm characteristics which may give rise 
to agency problems.  Agency theory predicts that managers who own partial or no stakes in the 
firms they manage may be prone to excessive consumption of perquisites. We find that firms with 
weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives.  We also find that 
greater competitive pressures from real markets are associated with lower perquisite consumption. 
Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with 
greater levels of perquisite consumption.  Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite 
consumption can be attributed to an agency problem.  Efficiently operating firms are associated 
with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms.  These results are consistent with 
the thesis that firms with a large asset base recruit and compensate high marginal product 
managers at a level consistent with the value they add. Our tests include an examination of the 
dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of 
perquisites consumed.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The expropriation of corporate resources by those who control a corporation, the self-
dealing problem, has long been a topic of interest amongst observers concerned with the 
intersection of corporate practices and corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, 2003; among others).  The media is rife with 
stories of these corporate excesses.  Jay Hooley, the CEO at State Street Corporation, had a car 
and driver at his disposal, the amount of this perquisite totaled $27,852 (Healy 2013).  Compared 
to Mr. Hooley’s total compensation of $15.6 million, this perquisite is miniscule but researchers 
view this type of perquisite consumption as executive excess.  A contrasting view is that perquisites 
are simply one element of an optimally designed compensation package (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Murphy, 1999; Murphy, 2002; Core et al., 2003; among others).    
In this study, we examine a unique set of data on perquisite consumption at 608 U.S. 
companies, between December 15, 2006 and June 30, 2007, which immediately followed the rule 
change implemented by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that increased the 
level of disclosure surrounding perquisites provided to executives.  We chose the period 
immediately after the rule change in order to mitigate the number of firms that would react to the 
rule change by restructuring or eliminating their perquisite programs.  The enhanced disclosure 
provides a glimpse into a facet of executive compensation that was once opaque, allowing us to 
determine whether the executive excess or managerial productivity explanations dominate 
perquisite consumption under greater disclosure rules.  We examine: (1) the dollar amount of 
perquisites, (2) the number of perquisites, and (3) the specific types of perquisites awarded to the 
CEO and of the top five most highly compensated executives for the companies in our sample.   
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 We find that firms with weak corporate governance and less managerial ownership are 
more likely to award a higher dollar amount and number of perquisites to executives. Our evidence 
also shows that firms facing less product market competition also award larger perquisites to their 
executives, a finding consistent with the proposition that a lack of real market competition may 
increase the probability of abusive practices.  Among the various types of perquisites, we find: air 
and long distance travel; equity related perquisites (not included in stock options or other equity 
compensation); legal, financial, and tax services; and, financial perquisites unrelated to savings or 
retirement, are more likely to be consumed by executives of firms characterized by weak 
governance.  We also find evidence that perquisites may be rewards for productivity, which 
suggests a dual role for perquisite awards.  
Our study is motivated in part by two important studies that examine the motives 
underlying perquisite consumption.  Yermack (2006) presents evidence that firms disclosing the 
private use of corporate jets during the period 1993-2002 experience negative market revaluations. 
Yermack also finds the common stocks of those same firms tend to underperform subsequent to 
the disclosure compared to matching firms with no private jet use.  Rajan and Wulf (2006), on the 
other hand, in a study of 300 firms sampled from the years 1986 to 1999 conclude that executives 
tend to use corporate jets in a fashion consistent with enhancing “productivity,” not executive 
excesses.  Prior to the new SEC disclosure requirement, perquisite awards were buried in the “all 
other compensation” category.  The statutory change allows us to delve into a more comprehensive 
menu of perquisite award, specifically on both individual components and total perquisite 
consumption.  We accomplish this by focusing on the number, type and amount of executive 
perquisites and how they vary by executive type.  We are one of the first studies to take advantage 
of the depth and breadth of expanded disclosure provided by the change in financial reporting rules.  
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As a consequence we are able to use the expanded disclosures to provide further evidence on the 
motivations behind the awarding of perquisites as additional compensation.   
We also expand the literature on perquisite consumption by presenting evidence on 
whether product market competition motivates corporate actions. Karuna (2007) provided 
evidence that three dimensions of product market competition: price-cost margin, market size and 
entry costs influence management incentives.  Our paper adds to the literature by addressing 
whether product market competition serves as a disciplining mechanism in another management 
context, the awarding and consumption of perquisites.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of extant 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of perquisite consumption and the explanatory variables 
we use in our investigation in Section II. Section III describes the sample selection procedure and 
presents descriptive statistics.  Section IV presents our empirical findings and Section V concludes.  
II. POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF PERQUISITE CONSUMPTION
     Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Perquisite Consumption 
A manager with a fractional equity stake in a firm does not bear the full cost of his 
perquisite consumption but reaps the full benefits.  Perquisite consumption may therefore be a 
form of self-dealing, and may be indicative of the severity of vertical agency problems (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).1  If perquisite consumption is a product of agency problems, internal and 
external factors that may act to reduce excessive perquisite consumption include those features of 
the corporate governance system which incentivize and discipline managers.  Internal governance 
measures include: 1) shareholder voting privileges, 2) various takeover defense provisions, 3) 
1 Yermack (2006) suggests a spillover effect may also emerge when perquisites result in no added real managerial 
productivity. He suggests that excess perquisites may foster low morale if employees believe management is taking 
advantage of perquisite consumption for personal gain and hence may result in a reduction in productivity overall.   
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factors related to the election and organization of the board and 4) alignment of executive and 
shareholder interests via shareholdings.  External governance pressures include: 1) the markets in 
which a firm buys and sells (e.g. the level of competition faced by the firm), 2) the institutional 
and concentrated shareholder pressure, and 3) the market for corporate control.2     
We first examine internal governance mechanisms.  First, we examine the corporate 
governance/shareholder rights index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003), which is an aggregation 
of factors characterizing corporate governance and shareholder rights, labeled as the GIM index. 3  
Specifically, the index includes characteristics that Gompers et al. (2003) group as follows: Delay 
factors, Voting factors, Protection factors, Other takeover defenses, and State of Incorporation 
factors. Larger values of the index are indicative of fewer overall shareholder rights, i.e. weaker 
governance.  If corporate governance is an important determinant of perquisite consumption, then 
we expect to observe more perquisite consumption when governance is weak, and hence expect a 
positive relation between GIM and perquisite consumption.   
A complementary indicator of governance not accounted for in the GIM index is the 
independence of the board of directors.4  Gillan (2006) refers to the board of directors as “..the 
lynchpin of corporate governance” (p. 385).  The primary thesis as it would apply in the context 
of perquisites is that less independent boards of directors, those that are more likely to be controlled 
by the CEO, are more prone to allow managers to waste assets.  This hypothesis predicts board 
                                                 
2 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001, 2003), Becht et al. (2003), Hermalin (2005), Gillan 
(2006), Djankov et al. (2008).    
 
3 The GIM index is a composite of twenty-four provisions in five sub-categories that a company may possess that 
limit shareholder rights and increase managerial power.  The higher the score the greater the power management 
possesses.  Basic data come from the corporate governance data files of RiskMetrics, ISS Governance Services, via 
WRDS.   
 
4 Bhagat and Bolton (2008) recently argued that accounting for a governance index, along with other governance 




independence to be inversely related to perquisite consumption.  We measure board independence 
as the ratio of independent (outside) board members to total directors.5  We obtain these data from 
the RiskMetrics governance files as well as the proxy statements of the sample companies.  
The third variable related to internal governance mechanisms is managerial ownership.   
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that as the proportion of shares owned by managers increases 
so does the value of the firm.  However, consistent with Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) find that inside equity ownership is non-linear and that as managerial ownership 
becomes highly concentrated firm value declines. Our proxy for the alignment of executive and 
shareholder interests via shareholdings (for instance, Ross, 1973, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is 
the effective percentage of total shares held or controlled by the five top executives for each 
company in the sample.  As our perquisite measures are for 2006 we use ownership for 2005 to 
avoid any potential issues with possible joint determination of contemporaneously measured 
values for ownership and perquisite consumption 6. Since prior literature is mixed regarding 
whether managerial ownership serves an overall positive or negative benefit we have no prediction 
concerning the relation between managerial ownership and perquisite consumption.  We obtain 
ownership data from the Compustat ExecuComp database.   
There is mounting evidence regarding the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
actions (see Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Becht et al., 2009).  Becht et al. 
                                                 
5 Our board independence measure is the number of outside directors scaled by total board membership.  Prior 
literature has shown that the ratio of independent board members mitigates the incidence of fraud, reduces the level 
of discretionary accruals and reduces the level of optimism in management forecasts (Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 
1996, Farber 2005, among others), however, find little evidence of this relation. 
 
6 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) is one paper that uses a similar lagged approach.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) 
examine the relation between managerial ownership and firm value.  The paper uses the lagged value of managerial 
ownership and relates it to Tobin’s Q, their measure of firm value in the next period.  Managerial ownership is thus 
treated as exogenous. Similarly, we measure perquisite consumption one period after our dependent variable, 
managerial ownership thus seeking to minimize endogeneity. 
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(2009), for instance, highlight the important behind-the-scenes influence of institutional investors 
and the positive value-related effects of such jawboning.  If institutions bring pressure on managers 
to make efficient decisions, we would expect to observe an inverse relation between institutional 
ownership and perquisite consumption, if perquisite consumption stems from an agency problem.  
We measure institutional ownership as the percentage of shares held by institutional owners. 7 
Another internal governance mechanism that has received increased attention is the 
founder/founding family.  The wealth of the founding family is tied up in the firm thus providing 
incentives to monitor management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Weisskopf, 2012). This research suggests that the presence of a founder/founding family should 
be a disciplining presence and serve a monitoring role because there is incentive alignment 
between the family and non-family shareholders.  The flip side of this argument is the 
entrenchment effect, where we have founders extracting resources for their own benefit.  Anderson 
et al. (2009) find evidence that in opaque environments founder/founding family firms have 
incentives to extract resources for their private benefit.  Chen et al. (2012) similarly find more of 
an entrenchment effect in founder/founding family firms when internal controls are weak.  These 
weak internal controls lead to more accounting misstatements and fraud than in non-family firms.    
The literature is mixed as to whether founder/founding firms incentives are aligned with 
shareholders or whether the entrenchment effect leads to resource extraction.  We therefore do not 
have a prediction for this variable.  We use the measure of founder/founding family ownership 
from Bagnoli et al. (2008) where the presence of the founder or descendants in management, on 
the board or among the company’s top shareholders is an indicator variable set equal to 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
                                                 
7 Prior studies that examine the monitoring role of institutional investors on corporate decision making and financial 
reporting include, Bange and DeBondt (1998), Bushee (1998), Chung et al. (2002) and Ajinkya et al. (2005).   
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Numerous authors including Hart (1983), Hermalin (1992), Schmidt (1997) and Karuna 
(2007), Giroud and Mueller (2010), suggest that product market competition can act as an 
important disciplining force by driving out bad managerial practices.  Karuna (2007) shows that 
several measures of product market competition influence management incentives.  Karuna (2007) 
uses price-cost margin (Demsetz, 1997) an indicator of product substitutability.  More intense 
competition is predicted to produce a smaller price–cost margin.  We follow Karuna (2007) and 
calculate the price–cost margin as sales less operating costs divided by operating costs, all at the 
four-digit SIC code level. We expect a negative relation to exist between product substitutability 
and the amount and level of perquisites if perquisites are consumed as a consequence of an agency 
problem. The second dimension of competition, market size reflects the demand in a particular 
industry.  If demand is high, less competition may be present and less discipline.  We would thus 
expect a positive relation between market size (measured by industry sales at the four-digit SIC 
code level) and the amount and number of perquisites.  The last dimension of competition is entry 
costs, which represent the minimal level of investment that must be incurred by new entrants into 
the industry.  If entry costs are high this deters new firms from entering the market.  The firms 
who are currently operating in the market then enjoy lower competition due to the barrier to entry.  
We thus expect a positive relation between entry costs (measured by the average of property, plant 
and equipment by the four-digit SIC code level then weighted by each firm’s market share in this 
industry and the amount) and level of perquisites.   
Presence of Potential Agency Problems 
Jensen (1986) suggests that when managers have access to excess free cash flow, they may 
tend to spend it in ways that benefit themselves but which reduce shareholder wealth. One way in 
which managers may waste cash flow is through the consumption of extra perquisites.  Jensen 
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(1986) argues that companies characterized by few growth opportunities but high cash flow present 
prime settings for the abuse of resources by managers.  We define the variable GRW as 1 for firms 
that have low growth opportunities but high cash flows, and 0 otherwise. Using the universe of the 
Compustat 2006 research file, we calculate the Fama-French (1997) industry adjusted sales growth 
and free cash flow values for each firm. We then use the median values of industry-adjusted growth 
and free cash flow to assign a value to GRW for each firm.  If perquisite consumption is evidence 
of managerial excess and Jensen’s hypothesis is valid then we predict that perquisite consumption 
and GRW should be positively related, ceteris paribus. 
Several academic studies provide evidence of the destructive effect that corporate 
diversification has on firm value (for example, Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Liebeskind and Opler, 
1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996; among others).  Denis et al. (1997), Jiraporn et al. 
(2006) and Hoechle et al. (2012) present evidence suggesting that the diversification discount is 
inversely related to corporate governance quality.  Company-level diversification has been 
associated with the hypothesis that company-level decisions may be motivated by managerial 
interests that are not in line with those of shareholders, which suggests the number of business 
segments may be an indicator of agency problems within the firm.  We would expect to see a 
positive relation between the number of business segments and perquisite consumption, if 
perquisite consumption is the product of an agency conflict.  
 Shareholders of modern corporations delegate most expenditure decisions to managers. 
Companies whose capital is relatively less tangible (i.e., more growth options) may be subject to 
greater information asymmetry and agency problems as capital providers cannot observe, monitor, 
and assess spending on and the management of intangibles as easily as tangible assets (see for 
instance Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993, 1995; among others).  If the relative 
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contribution of intangibles to the total real capital of firms is correlated with the general presence 
of agency problems, then we would expect such a measure to be positively related to perquisite 
consumption.  One measure of the relative contribution of intangible assets (e.g., growth 
opportunities) to a firm’s total real capital is book-to-market ratio (BTM).We compute the BTM 
as the book value of total equity divided by the total market value of equity, and labeled as BTM 
and is measured at year-end 2005. 
Alternative Explanations to Perquisite Consumption 
 Compensation Policy 
Fama (1980) suggests that perks may serve to supplement an imperfect compensation 
policy.  Executives may compensate to balance this perceived shortfall in cash compensation by 
consuming perquisites.  In this context, perquisites are not necessarily detrimental to value but act 
to complete managerial compensation programs.  This theory predicts a negative relation between 
abnormal compensation and the level of perquisites.  We follow Yermack (2006) and measure 
abnormal compensation as the residual value from the regression of the sum of CEO’s non-
perquisite compensation (salary, bonus and option awards) on the log of firm sales, CEO tenure, 
size adjusted stock returns and industry effects captured by two digit SIC dummy variables.8   We 
label the variable, Abnormal comp. 
Managerial Productivity 
Rajan and Wulf (2006) argue that the firm may benefit by offering perquisites because they 
are a strategic factor useful in maximizing the productivity of management, and hence are by 
design part of an optimal compensation policy.  The premise is that some perks could enhance the 
                                                 
8 Our estimation is based on the universe of 2006 ExecuComp database.  
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use of an executive’s time thereby enhancing productivity. One possible implication of this 
argument is that more productive executives will receive more perks. 
This is similar to the views of Holmstrom (1979) and Smith and Watts (1992) which 
suggest that higher marginal product decision makers are rewarded with higher compensation. 
Under this explanation, we would expect to observe that more productive firms pay greater 
perquisites and a positive association between productivity and perquisite consumption.  We 
measure corporate productivity using a measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012).  The 
measure assigns an efficiency score to a firm based on inputs (capital and expenses) and outputs 
(revenue) for the company after accounting for industry effects.9  We label the variable Efficiency.    
Firm Size 
Large firms may seek to attract high marginal product managers since such firms have 
greater resources to manage.  If perquisites are a reward for productivity then we would expect 
large firms to provide greater rewards to a high marginal product manager as compared to a low 
marginal product manager.  As a consequence if paying greater perquisites allows such firms to 
attract better managers with a higher marginal productivity, we would expect a positive relation 
between a measure of firm size and perquisite consumption.  
Taxes 
Disclosure of total compensation provides the IRS with another tool to monitor whether 
information on a company’s tax return is accurate. 10  If disclosure of a perquisite amount is 
incomplete, as was the case prior to 2006, firms might view perquisite awards as a tax-advantaged 
way to pay their executives (Rajan and Wulf 2006).  Another possibility of course follows from 
                                                 
9 We thank Peter Demerjian and Sarah McVay for providing us the efficiency score data used in this study. 
 




the fact that many perquisites are not taxable income to the executive receiving them.  If the 
marginal tax rate of the executive is positive then the executive will prefer a non-taxable perquisite 
to receiving the same amount as taxable income, ceteris paribus. 
As we are examining a cross-section of firms for the same year, the statutory federal tax 
rate is the same for all executives however the state tax rates they face will vary depending upon 
their state of residence.  We define the variable state tax as the highest marginal state personal 
income tax rate for the state in which a company is headquartered. We predict that the higher the 
marginal tax rate in the state in which a company’s headquarters resides, the more executives will 
prefer perks. The simple reason is tax avoidance since perquisites are not taxable income to the 
executives.   
Managerial Status 
 Frank (1985) argues that individuals are concerned with the social position of the groups 
to which they belong, and also with their positions within those groups. Rajan and Wulf (2006) 
argue that to the extent relative status within the firm increases an executive’s utility, and to the 
extent that perquisite levels are positively associated with status, providing perquisites may be a 
cost-effective way of compensating executives.  Simply, the marginal cost to the company of a 
perquisite award may be less than the marginal cost if the award was made as salary.  This would 
occur if the executive values the marginal perquisite award more highly due to the status it bestows 
in the eyes of his or her peers. 
Further, Frank (1985) and Ranjan and Wulf (2006) suggest that managerial consumption 
of perquisites is regarded as a measure of status by executives, similar to other potential status 
proxies such as the size and complexity of the company. If status dictates the demand for 
perquisites by executives, then at one level perquisite consumption for status purposes is just 
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another manifestation of the presence of an agency problem.  Rajan and Wulf (2006) predict that 
large firms are probably more likely to fall into this category.  We employ as a measure of size to 
capture this effect the total market capitalization of the firm, computed using data from CRSP  
measured at year end, prior to the release of the proxy statement.  We use a log transform of market 
capitalization in our analyses. 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Perquisite Disclosure 
Prior to August 2006 the reporting of perquisite awards by U.S. corporations was limited 
because of the SEC disclosure requirements then in effect.  The SEC proposed a new set of 
disclosure rules in early 2006 which became final on August 29, 2006 and applied to proxy 
statements filed with the SEC on or after December 15, 2006 (SEC Release 33-8732A).11  Under 
the new rules, if the aggregate perquisite award exceeds $10,000, the perquisite must be identified 
and disclosed.  In addition, if the value of a perquisite is the greater of $25,000 or 10% of total 
perquisites, its value must be disclosed.12  
By the new SEC rules, an item is not a perquisite “if it is integrally and directly related to 
the performance of the executive’s duties” (SEC Release 33-8732A), but an item is a perquisite 
“if it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect, without regard to whether it 
                                                 
11 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, SEC Release 33-8732A (August 29, 2006). 
 
12 Prior to the new SEC rules, the SEC required firms to disclose in their proxy statements any perks over $50,000 or 
10% of total cash compensation and to identify specifics if each perquisite was 25% of total perquisites value in proxy 
statements (SEC Release No. 33-6962. see SEC 1992).  These thresholds potentially allowed firms to avoid disclosure 
through a policy of strategically allocating just less than the thresholds. The new rules establish a minimum threshold 
amount for reporting perquisites of $10,000. Once reported, each perquisite and its amount have to be identified in 




may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company” and “unless it 
is generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees.” (SEC Release 33-8732A).13 
The Perquisite Data 
Our initial sample is comprised of all firms included in the S&P 1,500 as of the end of 2006 
which also have governance data available in the RiskMetrics Group’s (ISS Governance Services) 
database of corporate governance indicators for the year 2005.14  We require that each sample firm 
have accounting data (Compustat) and stock price data (CRSP) available for the year ended 2005.  
We excluded firms from the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999).  The process of applying 
these screens to companies which issued proxy statements between December 15, 2006 and June 
30, 2007 produced a sample of 693 companies.  We focus on the time period immediately after 
the rule change in an effort to obtain a true picture of perquisite consumption before firms decided 
to eliminate or restructure their perquisite programs. Our narrow window was an attempt to 
mitigate sample loss due to changes in perquisite programs.  Even with this narrow window, 
approximately three percent of our sample firms decided to change their perquisite programs.   
Extending the window would have allowed firms more time to react to the rule change and 
ultimately restructure or eliminate perquisite programs. 
We collected compensation and perquisite consumption information for the CEO and the 
five top executives for whom the reporting rules required perquisite data disclosure.  Details on 
                                                 
13 The SEC provides the following items as examples of perquisites: “club memberships not used exclusively for 
business entertainment purposes, personal financial or tax advice, personal travel using vehicles owned or leased by 
the company, personal travel otherwise financed by the company, personal use of other property owned or leased by 
the company, housing and other living expenses (including but not limited to relocation assistance and payments for 
the executive or director to stay at his or her personal residence), security provided at a personal residence or during 
personal travel, commuting expenses (whether or not for the company’s convenience or benefit), and discounts on the 
company’s products or services not generally available to employees on a non-discriminatory basis.” 
 
14 RiskMetrics Group purchased the data compilation arm of IRRC in 2006.  The arm of RiskMetrics Group which 
compiles the current data is ISS Governance Services.  We accessed the data via the WRDS portal. 
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perquisite awards are reported in a footnote to the compensation summary table of the proxy 
statement and include the number of different awards, the sizes of the awards, and how the awards 
are distributed.   We also require that all salary information for the five top executives be reported 
and that all sample firms comply with the new SEC disclosure rules in preparing their 
compensation summary tables. This reduced the sample to 645. Thirty-seven companies are 
excluded for lack of data.  There are 608 firms in our final sample.  Based upon the Fama-French 
(1997) industry classifications our sample covers forty-three different industries.  Utilities have 
the highest percentage representation in our sample (67 firms, 11.02 %) while the remainder (not 
reported) are fairly evenly distributed across the industry groups.15   
 Descriptive Statistics for Perquisites 
 We classify perquisite items into 10 broad categories:16 (1) air and long distance travel 
expenses, (2) company car and local transportation, (3) entertainment and other extra-curricular 
activities, (4) personal and family related perquisites that enhance the home/family situation of the 
executive, (5) severance package and/or special dividend distribution, (6) legal, financial, and tax 
services, (7) medical allowances and medical expenses paid by the corporation, (8) financial 
perquisites unrelated to savings or retirement, (9) administrative privileges, and (10) other. Firms 
sometimes disclose the use of a perquisite item but not the exact dollar amount of the perquisite.  
Our sample includes 10 such companies.  In such cases we record the perquisite only as having 
                                                 
15 The tabulation is available from the authors upon request. 
 
16 In classifying perquisite items, we exclude non-perquisite items that are included in “All Other Compensation” such 
as (1) severance/retirement/change-in-control payments, (2) dollar value of life insurance premiums, (3) discounted 
security purchases (unless generally available), and (4) dollar value of dividends or other earnings paid on 
stock/options when not factored into the grant date fair value. However, we view tax-gross ups as perquisites and 
include them in our analysis. The use of “All Other Compensation” as an indicator of total perquisite consumption 
will overstate the dollar value of perquisites. 
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been paid.  Appendix A provides a detailed description of our classification scheme and each 
perquisite category’s sub-components.  
 Table I presents the frequency of use of each perquisite by executive type: CEO, CFO, and 
the next three most highly compensated executives.  We label the latter executives, EA, EB and 
EC. Approximately 88% of the top five executives receive at least one perquisite item and there is 
no statistical difference. The most frequent perquisite, which was provided by over 50% of the 
sample firms, was the provision for legal, financial and tax services (Type 6).  In addition to the 
payment for the preparation of tax returns, this category includes tax gross-ups.  The second most 
frequent type of perquisite, provided by roughly 40% of the sample firms, was the provision of a 
company car and /or local transportation (Type 2).  This category includes payments for leased 
automobiles, chauffeured automobiles, gasoline and parking.  The third and fourth most frequent 
types of perquisites, provided by roughly 33% of the sample firms each, were the provision for air 
and long distance travel expenses (Type 1) and personal and family-related perquisites (Type 4).  
Type 1 perquisites include access to a corporate jet, travel on commercial airlines, lodging and 
travel allowances.  The least frequent types of perquisite awards were for medical and health 
benefits and administrative privileges, both provided by less than 7% of the firms in our sample. 
 Table II reports individual components of compensation, by executive type.  The median 
value of CEO salary is $780,000, which is twice that of the other four top executives.  This pattern 
is observed across the other components of compensation as well.  The median values of the other 
compensation components for the CEO including, stock awards, options and non-equity 
compensation, are as much individually as the baseline salary. The median dollar value for 
perquisites is $47,467 for the CEO, which is approximately 6% of the CEOs’ median base line 
salary.  Similar to the other compensation components, the median dollar value for the perquisites 
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of the other top executives drops to $14,253, $18,000, $15,451 and $13,850 respectively, 
representing about 4% of their median base line salaries.  Although 6% is a minuscule amount of 
the CEO’s salary, if this amount is due to agency problems, then the amount of the expropriation 
becomes a secondary concern and the material issue is the loss of shareholder wealth. 
We examine three alternative but complimentary measures of perquisite consumption: 1) 
the dollar value of perquisites, 2) the number of different perquisites, and 3) the types of perquisites.  
Each measure serves as an indicator of perquisite consumption.  The use of three alternative 
measures allows us to test the robustness of our conclusions to both how perquisites are measured 
as well as the statistical models employed in our analyses.  In addition to observations on the dollar 
levels of perquisites as highlighted in Table II, we also examine the number of perquisites 
consumed.  Data on the number of perquisite awards are reported in Table III, Panel A.  On average, 
CEOs receive 2.6 different types of perquisites.  In total, the five top executives receive on average 
12.95 perquisites per company.  
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Determinants of Perquisite Awards 
      Governance Related Variables 
Table III reports the descriptive statistics of our explanatory variables.  Throughout we 
employ lagged values of explanatory variables where appropriate to minimize any 
contemporaneous relations that might exist between those variables and/or measures of perquisite 
consumption.  Panel B of Table III reports statistics on governance-related variables.  We find the    
GIM index has a mean of roughly 9.5 and a median value of 9.  The large mean suggests weak 
stakeholder rights.  We also find that the five top executives own (Mgmt own) approximately 2.12 % 
of the shares outstanding and the mean fraction of the board composed of independent directors 
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(Board Indep) is 74%. The sample firms are heavily owned by institutions. The mean percentage 
of shares held by institutions (Inst holdings) is approximately 77 % while 27.1% of our sample is 
represented by founder/founder family firms (Family firm).  
The next three variables are potential disciplining mechanisms that Karuna (2007) 
examined in relation to managerial incentives.   We find the average price-cost margin (Price-cost 
mrg) for the sample firms is 0.141 which is our measure of product substitutability.  The higher 
the value of this measure the less substitutable the product.   The logarithmic value of market size 
(Mkt size) has an average value of 10.59, which is consistent with that of Karuna (2007).  Our 
measure of entry costs (Entry cost) has an average value of 3.85 which is significantly smaller than 
the mean of 7.0 captured by Karuna (2007) suggesting the entry costs in our sample firms are 
significantly lower.   
 Variables Pertaining to Alternative Explanation to Perquisites 
Panel C of Table III reports statistics related to our alternative explanation and control 
variables.  Jensen (1986) postulated that firms with both high cash flows and low growth (GRW) 
were apt to spend the cash in ways that didn’t benefit shareholders.  We find that 42% of our 
sample fits into this category.   Fama (1980) postulated that if managers view their compensation 
as imperfect, they will reward themselves with additional compensation.  Average abnormal 
compensation (Abnormalcomp), in our sample equals -$110,000. Note that because we use the 
universe of the firms contained in the ExecuComp database when estimating this value, the median 
value for our sample is not zero. The variable, Efficiency was defined by Demerjian et al. (2012) 
to represent the relative ability of managers to transform inputs into outputs within a given Fama-
French (1998) industry.17 The range for this variable is 0 to 1 with zero representing the least 
                                                 
17 See Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). 
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efficient and 1 the most efficient.   In our sample, Efficiency has a mean value of 0.73 suggesting 
that the managers in our sample firms are on average efficient in the management of company 
resources.   Finally, we find that the marginal state tax rate (State tax) has a mean value of 5% and 
the median value of the number of business segments in our sample is 3. Market value and the 
book-to-market ratio (BTM) have mean values of $10,954 (million) and 0.42 respectively.18 
 Table IV reports the pair wise correlations between the continuous variables related to 
perquisite consumption and governance.  The logarithmic values of the dollar amounts of 
perquisites consumed are positively correlated with GIM and generally statistically significant at 
conventional levels, consistent with the conjecture that weak governance is associated with greater 
perquisite consumption. Management ownership (Mgmt own) of shares is negatively correlated 
with perquisite consumption and generally statistically significant, consistent with higher 
ownership stakes dampening agency problems.  Our measures of board independence (Board 
indep) and institutional holdings (Inst holdings) tend not to show a significant correlation with 
perquisite consumption.  Two of the measures of real market competition tend to be significantly 
correlated with perquisite consumption and have the expected signs.  Both greater market size (Mkt 
size) and entry costs (Entry cost) show a positive and statistically significant correlation. 
The Dollar Amount of Perquisites 
Panels A and B of Table V present model estimation results when the dependent variable 
is the dollar value of perquisites consumed by the CEO and the five top executives, respectively.  
Each of the models presented in Table V reports the association between our measures of corporate 
governance and perquisite consumption.  In our models the proxy variables representing our 
alternative explanation are also included.  The models are estimated by ordinary least squares 
                                                 
18 We use the log transform of market capitalization as our measure of firm size. 
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methods and robust standard errors are used in the computation of coefficient tests statistics (see 
Greene, 2008). 
 The results presented in Panel A of Table V indicate that GIM, Inst holdings, Mkt size and 
Entry cost are statistically significant and in the predicted directions.   These results taken together 
suggest that when a firm has a weak governance structure perquisite consumption is higher.  The 
results also show that perquisites may serve another role in the organization. Specifically, 
perquisites may be a reward for productive managers.  In columns (1) through (3), Efficiency is 
positive and statistically significant suggesting that more efficient managers are rewarded with a 
higher dollar amount of perquisites.  There appears to be a duality involved with perquisite 
consumption.  In firms with weak governance mechanisms, perquisite awards are the result of 
agency problems, but in the presence of efficient managers the increase in perquisite awards 
represents a reward for managerial efficiency.  We also find Numberofsegs is positive and 
significant which is problematic and suggests there is some support for the status argument.    
Panel B of Table V presents the regression results for models using the dollar amount of 
perquisites provided to all five top executives. The results are similar to those in Panel A except 
Inst holdings is no longer significant.  Overall, Panel Table V shows that weak governance and 
weak product market discipline are associated with higher levels of perquisite consumption.  But 
in the face of an efficient manager perquisite consumption increases. Again, the results suggest a 
dual purpose for perquisite consumption within the organization. 
In untabulated results, we divide our sample by size based on total assets.  For small firms 
we find stronger results, governance reduces the level of perquisites to both the CEO and the five 
top executives.  We then compare our current sample to the period before the rule change in an 
effort to investigate what impact the rule change had in the post period and find that in the post 
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period, the coefficient on GIM shrinks significantly.  This suggests that small firms benefitted most 
from the rule change.  As a result of the change, smaller firms have a mechanism to control 
perquisite consumption that didn’t exist before. 
The Number of Perquisites 
Table VI reports results in which the dependent variable examined is the number of distinct 
perquisite items provided to the CEO (Panel A), and the five top executives (Panel B). The number 
of perquisite items has several merits as a dependent variable. First, the dollar measure may not 
correctly depict the proclivity of perquisite consumption.  Due to the nature of the dependent 
variable (i.e. count data) we estimate the model using a Tobit regression with quasi-maximum 
likelihood methods (see Greene, 2008). 
We find results that are similar to those presented in Table V.  Panel A of Table VI presents 
results for the number of perquisite items awarded to the CEO.  The coefficient on Efficiency is 
consistently positive and significant at conventional levels, indicating that efficient managers 
enjoy a greater number of perquisites.  GIM is positively and significantly associated with the 
number of perquisite items. Mgmt own is negatively associated with the number of perquisites, 
albeit at slightly more elevated test levels.  Similar to the results in Table V, Mkt size and Entry 
cost have a positive and statistically significant association with the number of perquisites.  Overall, 
the results presented in Table VI are generally consistent with the results presented in Table V.   
One important exception between Tables V and VI is the evidence that managerial ownership has 
a negative influence on the number of perquisites consumed.      
 In summary, the number of perquisites awarded increases as overall governance quality 
weakens, as the threat of product market competition decreases, and if managers have a smaller 
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ownership stake. However, the evidence also shows the duality of perquisites with them also 
serving as a reward for high marginal product managers.   
The Types of Perquisites Consumed 
In this section we examine the firm’s choice to provide a perquisite of each type.  We report 
results based upon CEO perquisite consumption only for brevity.  A binary dependent variable is 
defined for each perquisite type.  We estimate a probit specification for each perquisite type 
(Greene, 2008). 19   Table VII provides the probit estimation results.   
The results indicate that perquisites classified as Type (1), air & long distance travel 
expenses (Panel A), Type (5), equity related perquisites not included in stock options or other 
equity compensation (Panel B), Type (6), legal, financial, and tax services (Panel C) and Type (8), 
financial perquisites unrelated to savings or retirement (Panel D), are more likely to be consumed 
by executives of firms characterized by weak governance.  These panels indicate an association 
between GIM, institutional holdings (Inst holdings), management ownership (Mgmt own), market 
size (Mkt size) and entry costs (Entry cost) and the choices of these particular perquisites.  The 
results suggest perquisite awards are indicative of an agency problem and are more prone to occur 
in situations where weak governance or weak external market pressures are present. 
In summary, we examine three alternative but complimentary measures of perquisite 
consumption: 1) the dollar value of perquisites, 2) the number of different perquisites, and 3) the 
types of perquisites.  Each measure serves as an indicator of perquisite consumption.   Based on 
the results of our empirical analysis we find results that suggest firms with weak governance, which 
is a sign of agency problems, award more perquisites.  We also find results that support the 
contention that perquisites are an award for managerial productivity.  This suggests a dual role for 
                                                 




perquisites.  On one end of the spectrum, perquisite awards serve as a reward for productivity and 
on the other end they are a precursor to agency problems.  We find no support for our free cash 
flow, abnormal compensation, intangible intensity or tax alternative explanations for perquisite 
consumption. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of whether perquisite awards reflect an agency problem or are provided to reward 
high marginal product managers is an open question in the accounting literature.  The studies of 
Yermack (2006) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) reach different conclusions on the matter.  
Collectively, the results from this study show a consistent pattern of results.  The results indicate 
that weak internal governance quality, weak product market competition, low managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership are associated with perquisite consumption, whether 
measured in dollars or number of perquisites awarded.  Larger more complex companies 
(companies with more business segments) also award more perquisites, consistent with the 
presence of agency problems, but these results are also consistent with large firms hiring and 
rewarding high marginal product managers.  We also find evidence that firms characterized by 
greater managerial efficiency award greater perquisites, consistent with the hypotheses that 
perquisites enhance productivity.  Hence we conclude that there is a duality associated with 
perquisite awards depending on the organization.  As a result, neither the agency hypothesis of 
perquisites indicating managerial abuse of privilege, nor the hypothesis that perquisites are solely 
the product of reward for productivity can individually explain the data, rather both hypotheses 
taken together explain the seemingly disparate results in the literature.  
A limitation of our study is our focus on the time period immediately after the rule change, 
firms that filed proxy statements between December 15, 2006 and June 30, 2007.  This narrow 
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window was chosen intentionally so firms did not have time to react to the rule change by 
restructuring or eliminating their perquisite programs. The narrow focus, however, limits the 
generalizability of our results to time periods beyond our sample period.  This limitation, however, 
opens the door for an interesting question we leave for future research which is what factors drive 
the choice by firms to change their policies related to perquisites and the subsequent, valuation 
consequences of such changes, all of which must be predicated on a model of expectations.  
Roughly three percent of the firms in our sample decided to change their perquisite program, 
following institution of the new SEC reporting rule.  Unfortunately, the sample of changes is far 
too small for us at this time to make meaningful statements about the factors driving these choices, 
we do observe a pattern of negative revaluations (not reported) for these cases and that firms with 
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Appendix A: Perquisite classifications 
 
Type Description Items Included 
1 
Air & Long Distance 
Travel Expenses – 
Includes all air travel 
expenses and other long-
distance travel expenses. 
• Personal use company aircraft – Expenses from the use of a company owned 
or leased aircraft by an executive or the family/friends of the executive. 
• Air travel allowance – Any expenses from air travel that are not the result of 
the executive using a company owned or leased aircraft. This would include 
such items as commercial airplane tickets. 
• Other long-distance travel – This includes all of the costs associated with 
executive long distance travel—hotels and lodging away from home as well 
as the expenses associated with spouse and family accompanying the 
executive. 
2 
Company car & local 
transportation – 
Includes expenses 
associated with car and 
local transportation. 
• Transportation allowance – This includes automobile insurance paid by the 
company, as well as gas and parking. 
• Use of company automobile – This category includes the personal use of a 








country club and dining 
privileges. 
• Payments to clubs for membership dues, fees, and initiation -- Includes 
health, lunch country and airway clubs.  This category also includes alcohol, 
meal discounts and allowances at nice restaurants. 
• Vacation expenses and vacation payouts – This includes payments for 
executive vacation and retreats. Entails items such as travel vouchers. 
Payouts for vacations not used by executives also fall under this category, as 
does holiday pay. 
• Sporting and other entertainment events and expenses related to those events 
– This would include the cost of tickets. 
4 




of the executive 
• Security – This entails personal and home security paid for by the 
corporation for the executive.  
• Housing allowances – This category encompasses all payments made by the 
corporation for housing, whether it be temporary or permanent, and any 
payments for home maintenance, home improvement, or utilities. 
• Moving and Relocation – This category is for compensation to executives 
for moving, relocating. This includes payments to previous employers for 
moving to the company, foreign service premiums, and any expatriate 
payments. 
• Education expenses paid for by the corporation – This includes all education 
expenses for the executive and the family. This would entail items like 
college tuition and an “education allowance”. 
5 
Equity related 
perquisites not included 
in stock options or other 
equity compensation 
• Encompasses any dividends and stock distributed to the executive, as well 
as any special plans for the executive to purchase stock. 
6 Legal, Financial, and Tax Services 
• Legal fees – Any payments made by the corporation for legal fees or services 
incurred by the executive. 
• Financial and tax planning services – Corporation payments for financial 
and tax planning services. 
• Tax payments & tax gross-ups – This category includes all tax payments and 
gross-ups for the executive, with no attention given to the item being grossed 





Appendix A: Perquisite classifications (continued) 
 
7 Medical and Health Benefits 
• Medical allowances and medical expenses paid by the corporation – This 
category includes any specific medical items such as: physicals for the 
executive and family, dental and vision, prescription drugs, medical 
reimbursements, physical training/therapy, and medical exams. 
8 
Financial Perquisites 
unrelated to savings or 
retirement 
• Imputed Interest  
• Loans, Gifts, and Discounts – This category encompasses loans to the 
executive, any interest payments made by the corporation on behalf of the 
executive, any loans forgiven, any gifts to the executive, any discounts 
granted to the executive.  
• Executive allowances  / Executive choice plans / Flexible spending plans / 
cash allowances – This is a broad category meant to capture any allowances 
allocated to executives that isn’t specifically defined and gives the executive 
discretion on how to use the money. 
• Charitable and gift matching contributions – Contributions matched by the 
corporation for donations and gifts given by the executive to a charity or 
another entity. 
9 Administrative Privileges 
• Use of secretarial/administrative assistance and other support staff – This 
would include using the services of a secretary for personal matters and 
personal IT support. 
• Corporation payments for supplies and equipment utilized by an executive. 
 Allowances given to the executive or reimbursement for payment of business 
related expenses or services performed by the executive for the company. 
This category includes director’s fees. 
• Communication expenses – Payments by the corporation for the executive’s 
cell phone service, internet service, and other communication related 
services and expenses. 
• Use of the company facilities / assets for personal use. Could include such 
items like using the company’s health facilities, or using a company boat. 
10 Other • Used for items in which no distinct categorization could be readily identified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
